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Abstract-Many software systems are evolving complex 
system of systems (SoS) for which inter-system 
communication is both mission-critical and error-prone. 
Such communication problems ideally would be detected 
before deployment. In a NASA-supported Software 
Assurance Research Program (SARP) project, we are 
researching a new approach addressing such problems. In 
this paper, we show that problems in the communication 
between two systems can be detected by using sequence 
diagrams to model the planned communication and by 
comparing the planned sequence to the actual sequence. We 
identify different kinds of problems that can be addressed 
by modeling the planned sequence using different level of 
abstractions. 
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Many software systems are actually evolving complex 
system of systems (SoS) for which inter-system 
communication is both mission-critical and error-prone. 
Software failures in the communication between the 
participating systems in a SoS, e.g. between Flight Software 
and the Ground System, can cripple system capabilities, 
cause loss of data, and even result in mission failure. Such 
problems ideally would be detected before deployment, but 
current state-of-the-art technologies do not easily support 
their detection calling for new research. 
A preliminary analysis of APL's Common Ground System 
(an evolving SoS) identified 15 trouble reports related to 
problems with inter-system communication that had adverse 
mission impacts and for which there were no workarounds. 
This finding motivates our research to develop automated 
support for architects and (I)V&V to check system 
communication across a SoS. 
Previous efforts have analyzed static architectures [ l ]  and 
have led to the development of a general understanding of 
dynamic architectures of small software systems [2], but 
they do not typically address the problems APL has been 
facing. In a NASA-supported Software Assurance Research 
Program (SARP) project called Architecture Analysis of 
Evolving Complex Systems of Systems, we are researching 
a new approach that will explicitly address such problems. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080039271 2019-08-30T05:27:20+00:00Z
In this paper, we describe the background to this SARP 
project, the problems we are addressing and problems we 
encountered in the existing technology that had to be dealt 
with, aspects of the proposed solution, as well as the results 
from a study we conducted in order to determine the 
feasibility of the proposed solution. 
no systematic way for architects, or a V&V or IV&V team, 
to describe and check these rules in a consistent manner 
across a SoS. This is especially true in situations where 
systems are composed of third-party components, since it is 
often impossible to program such checks when the system 
has been developed and provided to the system integrator. 
These problems are typical for complex and evolving SoS. 
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In 2006, APL and FC-MD conducted a joint research 
infusion project. The infused technology, the Fraunhofer 
SAVE (Software Architecture Visualization and 
Evaluation) tool was applied to APL's Common Ground 
System (CGS). Fraunhofer SAVE is a joint development 
effort between FC-MD and Fraunhofer Institute for 
Experimental Software Engineering (IESE). The goal of the 
infusion project was to eliminate maintenance and evolution 
problems. All of APL's NASA missions use the CGS for 
spacecraft I&T and operations. CGS is currently supporting 
operations for three deep space missions: MESSENGER, 
STEREO, and New Horizons. Flight software, scientific 
data processing software, and ground equipment software 
interface with CGS and depend on its services. The 
infusion project provided results that are used to improve 
CGS's architecture [3]. As part of the technology infusion 
project, we identified a set of problems related to dynamic 
aspects of CGS that are beyond the scope of the basic 
SAVE technology, which is based on static analysis of 
source code. 
TROUBLE REPORTS 
For this SARP project, we conducted an analysis of APL's 
databases of Change Requests and Anomaly Reports in 
order to understand how common and serious these 
problems are in reality. The analysis focused on the Ground 
System and the 15 trouble reports, which are related to 
problems with system interfaces and system 
communication. Currently, there is a lack of research and 
technology to address these problems. In particular, there is 
no automated support to describe and compare expected 
dynamic profiles of a SoS with the actual dynamic profiles 
in order to detect problems. Dynamic profiles are 
The proposed solution will address problems related to 
interfaces and the dynamic profiles of systems that 
communicate in runtime. The technology will allow the user 
to define and navigate the expected (a.k.a. planned, 
specified, desirable, ideal, baselined etc.) dynamic profile of 
a system as well as comparing it to the planned profile so 
that s h e  may evaluate whether the system conforms to 
specifications or not. We are researching different ways to 
define and navigate these dynamic profiles. For example, 
we are researching adding dynamic information to static 
descriptions and diagrams and formulating ways to 
explicitly define interface rules. These interface descriptions 
will be based on the already existing interface 
specifications. In these specifications, e.g. the order of calls 
and events, the size and format of data, as well as timing 
information are specified. We are also investigating ways to 
describe and collect data about resource allocation, since 
resource allocation can be viewed as a communication 
between a system and the operating system. We consider 
using a combination of static connection diagrams, 
sequence diagrams, rules, and assertions to describe the 
dynamic profiles. We are researching ways to collect data 
from the system during run-time as well as ways to compare 
the expected dynamic profile with run-time data in order to 
detect problems. 
The tool will be developed as an extension to the SAVE 
tool. SAVE is a tool that visualizes and compares the 
implemented software architecture (actual) with its planned 
architecture based on static analysis. One of the missing 
features of the SAVE tool in the context of SoS is its ability 
to detect dynamic linkages between systems. While analysis 
of individual systems is useful, there is also a need to 
analyze their interaction. 
characteristics of a system during runtime i s  observed 
through an interface, such as call and event ordering, data What makes such an is that the 
and data formats, resource consumption, and timing communication between these subsystems is established 
information. only at run-time for which mere static analysis, as is done in SAVE, is inadequate. The problem is that static analysis, 
While interfaces permit systems to communicate with each though sound, would report many false positives (spurious 
other, they are also often the source of problems. One connections that do not actually exist), because static 
reason for such problems is that systems are developed by analysis always constructs conservative over- 
different teams with different interpretations of interface approximations. For example, if two components listen to 
specifications. Individual developers may occasionally ports defined from the same sets of ports, then static 
attempt to include run-time checks in their code ensuring analysis would flag a dependency even if the ports they 
that interface specifications are followed, but there is often listened to did not have the same port id. One important part 
of this project is to research ways to detect such dynamic 
dependencies. 
Because SAVE has some of the needed capabilities (e.g. 
features for comparison of expected and actual 
architectures, visualization, navigation, etc), we will reuse 
its basic functionality, add a dynamic dependency detection 
and visualization component, and use a combination of 
static and dynamic analysis to extract the actual architecture 
from the code. At a very high level, this consists of taking a 
set of executions of the system then deducing dynamic 
dependencies based on trace analysis. In addition, SAVE'S 
approach for defining, visualizing, and navigating planned 
static architectures and comparing them with the actual has 
been shown to be very beneficial in other projects and thus 
provides a good foundation for this research. Thus, SAVE 
already has basic support for some of the required features 
that need to be added. However, before SAVE can detect 
problems in the interfaces, the tool has to be improved 
because such dynamic couplings remain undetected and 
applications cannot be analyzed together. 
THE COMMON GROUND SYSTEM (CGS) 
CGS [4] consists of 83 different evolving systems 
(applications). These applications are developed, compiled, 
and launched independently from each other, and participate 
in a complex pipe-and-filter architecture established during 
run-time, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1 - Archivesewer and EngDump in 
Common Ground's pipe&-filter architecture 
In this paper, we focus our examination on two applications 
that are representative of the Common Ground software 
architecture and which belong to the Assessment sub- 
system, see rectangle in Figure 1 : 
Archive Server - an application that serves 
selected telemetry packets from the archive 
Engineering Dump - a client to the archive server 
that extracts selected telemetry points from the 
archived packets, converts the raw telemetry points 
into engineering units using calibration data, and 
formats and stores the converted points in a file. 
Common - The two applications reuse source code 
through a component called common. 
Figure 2 -Planned Architecture: Engineering Dump is 
a run-time client of Archive Sewer; both applications 
are built using shared modules stored in "Common." 
The SAVE tool was used to analyze the structure of 
Archive Server and Engineering Dump. The planned 
architecture of the selected applications was modeled as 
shown in Figure 2. The figure illustrates that the 
Archive-Server and the Eng-Dump are dependent on each 
other and that they both use code from Common. 
I 
Figure 3 - Actual Architecture 
The actual architecture of the selected applications in Figure 
3 illustrates how the source code is organized in the file 
system. Each application has a folder called app-specific in 
which the code that is unique for that application is stored. 
Each application also has a folder called common. As the 
figure illustrates, there is one common folder for each 
application, but any file that exists in both folders are 
identical. 
Figure 4 - The planned dynamic dependencies between 
Archive Server and Engineering Dump are not visible to 
the SAVE tool, but there are some spurious couplings. 
The comparison of planned vs. actual architecture is shown 
in Figure 4, which is a combined diagram that illustrates 
several facts. On the one hand, the diagram illustrates the 
fact that the SAVE tool did not discover the direct 
dependencies between Engineering Dump and Archive 
Server. These "missing" couplings are illustrated by red 
crosses. SAVE does not detect these couplings because 
there are no static dependencies between the two 
applications since the two processes communicate 
dynamically via sockets and SAVE only detects 
dependencies that are present in the static code. 
On the other hand, the diagram illustrates that there are 
spurious couplings between Engineering Dump and Archive 
Server. To examine coupling of the Archive Server and 
Engineering Dump through the common modules, we 
analyzed the code together with the SAVE tool. This caused 
some confusion in the tool because the applications are not 
supposed to be compiled together causing namespace 
conflicts to occur. For example, in several cases, the same 
name was used for a global variable that exists in both 
applications. Since SAVE assumes that all names are 
unique, spurious couplings were introduced between the 
two applications. The spurious couplings are illustrated by 
exclamation marks in the diagram. 
In addition, there are some extra couplings between 
Engineering Dump and common as well as between 
Archive Server and common. These couplings are due to the 
fact that unexpected access and import dependencies are 
present in the source code. 
Thus, before the SAVE tool can be used for analysis of 
more dynamic problems related to two applications that are 
based on dynamic dependencies, a strategy has to be 
developed that allows for such analysis, removes spurious 
couplings, and identifies missing couplings as the ones 
described above. The strategy we discuss in this paper 
avoids these issues by viewing each application as a black 
box and by only focusing on the communication that occurs 
between the client and the server. In the future, we plan to 
develop a strategy that allows an analyst to move freely 
between the applications of such a system and analyze both 
structure and behavior on arbitrary levels of abstraction. 
PROBLEMS FROM TROUBLE REPORTS 
The analysis of APL's databases of Change Requests and 
Anomaly Reports identified 15 problems that could 
potentially be detected using dynamic analysis. These 
problems were discussed in a series of workshops with 
APL. Following are examples that are representative of 
such problems. 
APL has experienced several significant problems in getting 
the CGS to work with other systems such as the Flight 
Software, the Jet Propulsion System (JPL), Deep Space 
Mission System (DSMS), the APL Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE), and the remote Payload Operations 
Centers (POCs). Interface Control Documents (ICD) govern 
the communications with each of these external systems. 
However, APL frequently encounters systems that do not 
comply with ICD's. Another example is the Archive Server 
and the Engineering Dump. The Archive Server serves 
many other clients beyond the Engineering Dump. Other 
teams often develop those other clients and since there is 
little or no communication between the different teams, 
interface problems are introduced that are difficult to detect. 
APL conducts integration testing to a large extent, but 
problems still occur in operations because of incorrect use 
of communication protocols. 
A related example is a failure that occurred during the 
communication between the ground system and a satellite 
using the file transfer system CFDP. The satellite system 
was supposed to send a series of files and the ground system 
was supposed to acknowledge receipt of those files. A 
software valve had been added to the system so that the 
operators would be able to block uplink of CFDP 
acknowledgement messages while more important 
commands were being sent since bandwidth is always 
limited. At one point, the valve was closed and when the 
ground system started to recognize that file data was 
missing, it responded with NACKs (not acknowledged). 
However, due to the closed valve, these NACKs could not 
be transmitted and were stuck in a queue. The NACKs 
could only go through later when the valve was opened. 
Once the valve was opened, the NACKs caused the satellite 
system to send all the missing messages again. In fact, there 
were multiple NACKs for each file in the queue since a 
NACK is resent after each communication timeout. Thus, 
the missing file data was sent multiple times, crowding the 
connection and misusing the valuable bandwidth. 
It should be noted that in this example, both systems 
behaved according to the specified protocol. In addition, 
this problem was only detected by chance during an 
unrelated investigation, illustrating how difficult it is to 
detect such problems. What is missing is a way to analyze 
the behavior from the viewpoint of the architecture. From 
this viewpoint, a high number of NACK's is an indication 
that there is misbehavior. Another similar example that was 
mentioned is that in one case, the client connected to and 
disconnected from the server 4,000 times during a short 
time. On a micro level, this behavior matches the 
specification, but on a macro level it does not. The desired 
macro level behavior is to connect, stay connected, and only 
disconnect when there is no need to stay connected 
anymore. 
In both these examples, the main concern is intersystem 
communication, i.e. the communication of APL software 
with other systems, such as the satellite software. APL's 
interest is in verifying whether systems follow the 
communication procedures according to the ICD. However, 
mainly only micro level behavior (short sequences) is 
specified in the ICD while macro level or architectural 
behavior is not. Issues that frequently occur are ones related 
to 
Message sequencing 
Content of control messages 
Timing of messages 
Message sequencing is related to the order in which the 
messages are supposed to occur. Problems occur when 
messages appear in a different order than the specified one. 
Problems occur when the system expects a certain message 
but receives a different one. Timing of messages can be 
important, especially in situations when a message has to 
amve within a certain time period. Problems also occur 
when messages do not amve within the specified time 
period. Especially data messages can be large in size, but 
most of the time only the header of such a message is 
interesting for analysis, not the data itself. In this SARP 
project, we have started addressing problems related to 
message sequencing and content of control messages. In the 
future, we will address timing problems. 
Dynamic Compliance Checking Approach 
We studied whether our proposed solution would be 
feasible for detecting problems stemming from deviations 
from interface control documents. More specifically, we 
studied whether it would be possible to compare a planned 
sequence diagram with actual sequences in order to detect 
deviations. We were especially interested in identifying 
different kinds of communication problems, for example in 
terms of how much modeling would be necessary to detect 
them. Software development teams often lacks time and 
resources and if such modeling requires too much effort and 
too much modeling background, chances are that a new 
technology that relies on such modeling will never be used. 
The study was conducted in the following way. 
(1) The APL team produced a sequence diagram that 
specifies the planned communication between the 
server and the client. This sequence diagram was 
based on information provided in the ICD. 
(2) The APL team then captured dynamic data from a 
correct communication between server and the client. 
The communication was correct in that sense that it 
matches the planned sequence diagram (with one 
exception, see below). 
(3) The FC-MD team developed a parser based on the 
ICD and dynamic data provided. The parser reads the 
dynamic data and outputs the messages that were sent 
between the two applications. For each message, the 
timestamp, the message type, and the message content 
were provided. 
(4) Once it was determined that the parser worked 
correctly, the APL team produced a set of three 
communication sequences that each was not compliant 
with the planned sequence in one of the following 
ways: 1. There were missing messages, 2) there were 
extra messages, or 3) there were messages whose 
parameter values were inconsistent with the 
specification. The defects were specified by the APL 
team as well as the actual and correct system behavior. 
(5) The FC-MD team imported the sequences into SAVE 
and used the new SAVE prototype extension in 
combination with manual analysis to compare the 
planned sequence diagram to each of the actual 
sequence diagrams. 
(6)  Deviations between the planned and the actual 
sequences were analyzed, documented, and reported to 
the APL team. 
(7) The APL team determined whether the detected 
deviations were true or false. 
(8) The APL team and the FC-MD discussed the 
feasibility of the proposed approach and potential 
improvements to make it useable in a "live" situation 
at APL. 
The next subsections will discuss two of the three sequence 
diagrams. First, the specification will be presented, and then 
the evaluation and analysis results are discussed. 
Specification: The protocol as a high level planned 
sequence diagram 
The client (eng-dump) and the server (archive-server) 
communicate using a protocol that specifies four 
different types of messages: 
(1) The client defines a set of filters that together specifies 
the type of data that it requests the server to return. 
Examples of filters are: Type of data, e.g. STP or TP, 
and Time range, specified by start time and stop time. 
The filters from the client to the server can be sent in 
arbitrary order. 
(2) When the client has specified, using filters, what data 
to download, it sends a BeginPlayBack command to 
the server. Once this command has been issued, the 
client is not expected to send more messages. 
(3) As soon as the BeginPlayBack message has been 
received, the server starts sending data messages. Each 
data message must match the filter specification 
received earlier. For example, the type of each data 
message must be as specified and the time stamp of 
each message must fall within the specified time 
range. 
(4) When there are no more messages, the server sends an 
End Of Transmission (EOT) message to the client 
signaling. that the data transmission is complete; 
thereafter the communication link is closed. 
Since the goal is to develop a modeling and evaluation 
method that requires limited effort, we started by modeling 
the protocol using high level sequence diagrams, see Figure 
5. This model models the facts that there might be several 
filters followed by one Beginplayback message, and that 
there might be several data messages followed by one EOT 
message. This high level model (since it does not provide 
any information about the type of filters or data messages 
that we expect to occur, is called "high level planned 
sequence diagram.") 
Figure 5 - High-level planned sequence diagram 
Evaluation based on the high-level sequence diagram 
The next step was to evaluate sequences based on the 
planned sequence diagram. We started by applying it to the 
first sequence that we received. This sequence is expected 
to be correct, i.e. we expected it to match the specification 
without any extra or missing messages. The evaluation 
result is provided in Figure 7. As one can see in that figure, 
the final message EOT appears to be missing from the 
actual sequence. This is surprising because this sequence 
was supposed to be correct. The APL team analyzed the 
original 'nominal case' data and even re-ran the test 
example to verify that everything was correct. Still, it was 
difficult to understand why the EOT is not being sent from 
the archive server nor how the client knows when to close 
the socket. This can be a significant problem because clients 
are expected to close the socket to the server once they have 
received all the requested data, as indicated by the EOT 
message. If the EOT message is not being used for its 
intended purpose, clients may be employing some other 
means of recognizing that all the resulting data has been 
received. For example, they might check that the time 
stamp on the data is equal to exceeds the stop time 
specified. For a variety of reasons, including timestamp 
precision, multiple of packets from different paths andlor 
sources with the same timestamp, etc., this may lead to the 
client prematurely closing the socket and missing data 
subsequently to be returned by the server. During extended 
analysis, the APL team realized that the missing EOT 
message is actually not missing at all. Because the TCP 
packets, as reported by snoop, can aggregate data, the EOT 
message is actually at the end of the last TCP packet from 
the server to the client (i.e., the server produced two write 
statements for the STP and EOT, but it ended up as one 
TCP packet). This is perfectly legal, with Nagles algorithm 
enabled. Our issue in the analysis was that we were treating 
each snoop TCP packet as a message. This illustrates that 
our parsing algorithm has to be able to detect aggregated 
data situations. 
-I, I 
Flier 
Filw 
Begl~Flaybock 
Ra:a 
Data 
Raia 
EOT 
C 
I I 
I I 
Figure 6 - EOT is undetected 
In the next example, it was detected that a filter 
changeladdition was sent from the client to the server after 
BeginPlayback was sent while data from server to client 
was flowing. This filter message is ignored by the server (in 
fact, it might not even get read off the socket). The server 
assumes that clients read as fast they can, which could be 
severe problem if that is not the case. Thus, the risk is that 
the server gets stuck because that one client blocks the 
server. In addition, the client might expect the ignored filter 
to be in effect and thus receives the wrong data. 
Specification: The protocol as a low-level planned sequence 
diagram 
We proceeded by adding more information to the sequence 
diagram, see Figure 8. Two rules were modeled. 1. The rule 
that specifies that start time must be less that stop time, as 
well as 2. The rule that the data type of each of the received 
data messages must be the same as the specified type. We 
modeled these rules as assertions and added parameters to 
the messages. The parameters are used by the assertions and 
the assertions are evaluated for each message. Since we 
added more information to the model, we also needed to 
specify that the order between the different filters is not 
important. This is denoted by adding a star "*" in front of 
each filter. In addition, we needed to express the fact that 
there might be filters of other kinds than the ones we focus 
on. We express this by adding a general filter with stars as 
parameters. Since we needed to connect the data messages 
to the filter messages, we added a parameter Type. 
I EOT 
Figure 8 - Low level planned sequence diagram 
Evaluation based on the low-level sequence diagram 
We evaluated the captured sequences by applying the low 
level planned sequence diagram and matching it to the 
actual sequence. We use a lightning symbol to indicate that 
the names of the messages are correct but that there is a 
mismatch between the parameters of the messages. Thus the 
lightning symbol in Figure 9 indicates that the time 
specified in the 'STRT' (start time) was after the 'STOP' 
(stop time). Unfortunately, the ICD does not allow for an 
indication from the server to the client that it has specified 
an invalid filter. So a close() from the server, without an 
EOT message, is actually expected. Thus, though not a 
nominal case, this case illustrates compliance to the protocol 
defined in the ICD. 
Figure 7. An illegal extra filter is sent after 
BeginPlayback message has been sent. 
Figure 9 - Start time occurs after Stop time. 
Figure 10. "STF" was requested "STP" was received 
server simply ignored the invalid filter and used its default 
which is STP. The correct server behavior should have been 
to close the socket on an invalid filter. Dependent on how 
robustly the client was implemented, this can be a 
significant problem because the client might assume that 
same type of data that was requested will be returned and 
process the incoming data according to that type. In fact, 
several internal clients, including Eng-Dump, are indeed 
coded in this fashion and do not verify that the type returned 
and about to be processed is of the type requested. 
Obviously, processing data of the incorrect type will cause 
incorrect data to be generated or even client application 
crashes. 
The SARP project develops an approach for dynamic 
compliance checking and visualizing the results using 
sequence diagrams. The approach has been implemented as 
an extension to the SAVE tool and was validated in a first 
pilot study for APL's CGS. 
The results from the study show that problems in the 
communication between two systems can be detected by 
using sequence diagrams to model the planned or expected 
communication and by comparing the planned sequence to 
the actual sequence. The results also show that there are 
different kinds of problems and'that they can be addressed 
by modeling the planned sequence using different level of 
details. Sequencing problems, that is, messages that occur 
unexpectedly or out of order, can be detected by using high 
level sequence diagrams without details. Content problems, 
that is, problems which are related to the content of 
messages rather than to the order of messages require a 
more detailed modeling approach. The suggested approach, 
which is based on assertions in combination with sequence 
diagrams, seems to be a feasible approach for this problem. 
High-level modeling may be used without low-level 
modeling and vice-versa, allowing the user full flexibility 
over of the amount of time and resources helshe chooses to 
use the tool to detect such issues. The fact that only simple, 
standard modeling skills are necessary to become 
immediately productive with the proposed tool makes the 
approach appealing. 
In the last example, it was detected that data messages of 
the wrong type were sent to the client. The root cause is 
actually that a bad filter is sent from the client to the server: 
TYPE:STF. STF used to be a supported type, but no longer 
is. Old legacy clients might still request STF-data, if they 
have not updated to the new ICD. Since STF is not a valid 
option, the server returns STPs, which is not expected. The 
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Project Goal 
Goal 
- To research and develop a tool for run-time architecture analysis 
The new tool, Dyn-SAVE, 
- will extend the already existing static Software Architecture 
Visualization and Evaluation (SAVE) tool 
Background 
- SAVE successfully applied to JHUIAPL's Common Ground System 
in 2006 NASA Research Infusion project 
- Architecture = structure + behavior 
- Need for dynamic architecture analysis was identified 
- NASA IV&V support for a Software Assurance Research Project 
(SARP) to develop such a tool 
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The (static) SAVE Tool a 
Objective: Make ArchitectureIDesign specifications alive! 
Helps answer: Does the implementation match the plan? 
- Define a planned (andlor target) architecture (using rules etc); 
- Create an actual architecture from source code; 
- Compare planned architecture w l  actual, identifying architectural violations 
Features for Zooming, Filtering, Refactoring 
Language independent: C/C++, Java, Delphi, Ada, Simulink, Fortran 
Conclusion after applying SAVE at APL and to many other systems: 
- The SAVE approach is useful and practical 
- One can quickly model and analyze software architectures 
- But has some weaknesses since it's based on static analysis 
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Compare Planned 
What components in and Actual 
the client are affected Behavior 
by unspecified Form Actual 
communication? 
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Specify Level of Abstraction 
For analysis 
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Deviations from Interface Control Documents 
- One organization develops Ground Systems 
Think of it as a server 
- Other organizations develop clients 
- Everybody follows the same ICD (Interface Control 
Document), but interpret them differently 
- The systems are never tested together until they are 
made operational 
- The result is subtle deviations from specified behavior 
that are difficult to spot 
- Need a way to specify expected behavior and compare 
to actual 
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Research Questions 
Would it be possible to model the 
communication as a sequence diagram 
and use it to detect deviations? 
Can we identify a way to do iterative 
modeling, i.e. start with abstract models 
and add more details as necessary? 
How would we visualize deviations? 
Would such an approach be practical? 
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Evaluation based on high level planned 
sequence diagram 
I 
L I 
Rlter 
- 
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Data 
Data 
Data 
EOT 
1. I 
F~lter 
Fiiter 
Beginmayback 
Fitter 
Data d *- 
Data 
EOT 
I T 
1 I 
Left: EOT is missing from "correct sequence". Right: An 
illegal extra filter is sent after Beginplayback message 
has been sent. 
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Rules: 
1. Start time must be less that stop time 
2. The data type of each of the received data messages must be the same as 
the specified type. 
Mechanisms: assertions and message parameters 
Assertions evaluated for each message 
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Evaluation based on low level planne 
sequence d~agram 
Left: Stop time < Start time. Right: STF ordered - STP received. 
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Observations 
Sequencing problems 
- Messages that occur unexpectedly or out of order, 
can be detected by using high level sequence 
diagrams without details 
Content problems 
- Problems related to the content of messages rather 
than to the order of messages require a more detailed 
modeling approach 
The suggested approach 
- Is based on assertions in combination with sequence 
diagrams 
- Seems to be a feasible approach for this problem. 
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Research Approach 
Work as one team with problem-owners at APL 
Experiment with technology; apply to our testbed 
Evaluate technology; apply it to APL's CGS 
l mprove technology based on feed back, results 
Repeat 
Extend to NASA projects 
- e.g. through the Research Infusion program 

